What do al qaeda fight for

Together with Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leader, Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden ran one of seven main militias involved in the fighting. They established military training bases in Afghanistan and founded Maktab Al Khidamat, or Services Office, a support network that provided recruits and money through worldwide centers, including in the U. Bin Laden and Azzam had different visions for what to do with the network they had established. Bin Laden decided to found Al Qaeda, based on personal affiliations created during the fighting in Afghanistan as well as on his own international network, reputation and access to large sums of money.

The following year Azzam was assassinated. After the war ended, the Afghan-Arabs, as the mostly non-Afghan volunteers who fought the Soviets came to be known, either returned to their countries of origin or joined conflicts in Somalia, the Balkans and Chechnya. Al Qaeda vociferously opposed the stationing of U. The ultimate goal of this campaign was to depose the Saudi royal family and install an Islamic regime on the Arabian peninsula.

The Saudi regime subsequently deported bin Laden and revoked his citizenship in In bin Laden moved to Sudan, where he operated until During this period, Al Qaeda established connections with other terror organizations with the help of its Sudanese hosts and Iran.

While in Sudan, Al Qaeda was involved in several terror attacks and guerilla actions carried out by other organizations. In May , following U. Between and , Al Qaeda took part in several major terror attacks. Al Qaeda was involved in the bombing of two hotels in Aden, Yemen, which targeted American troops en route to Somalia on a humanitarian and peacekeeping mission. It also gave massive assistance to Somali militias, whose efforts brought the eventual withdrawal of U.

Bin Laden was also involved in an assassination attempt against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in June Two major terrorist actions against the U. There is little evidence to suggest a significant connection between bin Laden and the first World Trade Center bombing in After moving to Afghanistan, bin Laden escalated his anti-American rhetoric. Subsequently, Al Qaeda escalated its war against the U. In August , Al Qaeda bombed two U. In retaliation, the U. In October , Al Qaeda bombed the U.

Cole, an American guided-missile destroyer at Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American servicemen. It committed its most devastating attack on September 11, , when 19 Al Qaeda operatives hijacked four passenger planes and drove two into the Twin Towers in New York City and one into the Pentagon; a fourth plane crashed in rural Pennsylvania.

Nearly 3, people were killed in the attack. According to this theology, the ideal man is the Muslim holy warrior who is prepared to be martyred for the sake of God and the Jews represent his opposite. The battles currently being fought by Islamic terrorist groups may directly target the U.

In the years since, Al Qaeda has also attempted to establish a foothold within Israel and the Palestinian territories; though so far with little success. Indeed, several of the terrorists involved in the September 11th attacks were to a great extent motivated by their hatred toward Jews. Mohamed Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh, a key member of the Hamburg cell responsible for the attacks, considered New York City as the center for a global Jewish conspiracy, and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who masterminded the attack, had previously developed several plans to attack Israeli and Jewish targets.

In their view, New York, as a center of world finance, was the quintessential Jewish target. Al Qaeda has been involved in a number of attacks on Jewish targets, including: an attack on a Jewish synagogue in Tunisia on April ; the coordinated bombing of an Israeli-owned resort and an attempt to down an Israeli airliner in Mombassa, Kenya on November ; an attack on several Jewish-associated targets in Casablanca, Morocco on April ; the bombing of two Jewish Synagogues in Istanbul on November ; and an attack on several tourist resorts in Sinai, Egypt that are popular with Israelis on October Several additional plots around the world have failed.

Al Qaeda was, like many in the Middle East, committed in principal to the liberation of all Muslim lands and holy places, among these the Palestinian areas and the Al Aksa mosque in Jerusalem, but it was busier attacking its primary target- America and did not direct any recourses toward attacking Israel or Jews. There are several explanations to what brought Al Qaeda and its affiliates to change their strategy to include Israel and the Jewish people among their strategic targets.

First, the terror campaign against Jews seems to have been initiated and timed by the leadership, as evident from declarations made by Al Qaeda leaders and spokesmen. At first, post-September 11th declarations in support of the Palestinians may have been motivated by need for popularity.

But in it became apparent that Al Qaeda had made an ideological and strategic shift, making its enmity toward Jews more central. Any country that steps into the same trench as the Jews has only herself to blame. Following the American invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has relied more on locally-based organizations.

Attacking Jews also has an added propaganda value to Al Qaeda, which relies on the fact that anti-Semitic feelings are widespread in Muslim countries.

War in Afghanistan , a. Bin Laden evaded authorities until May 2, , when a covert operation by U. Forces loyal to al-Qaeda and its affiliates now number in the tens of thousands. But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us! Subscribe for fascinating stories connecting the past to the present. Intelligence officials believe bin Laden was responsible for many deadly acts of terrorism, including the bombings of the U.

Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania As much of the nation was just starting the day on the morning of September 11, , 19 terrorists hijacked four East Coast flights, crashing three of the airplanes into targets in New York and Washington, D. While under immense time pressure to vacate the premises before Pakistani military arrived, they quickly swept up a treasure trove In the universe of historic photographs, few are more iconic this this image of key White House policymakers watching and waiting for confirmation that SEAL Team Six had succeeded in capturing or killing Osama bin Laden.

The Islamic State of Iraq's insistence on enforcing their strict interpretations of religious law on Iraqi civilians and targeting members of other insurgent groups, including the religiously oriented Islamic Army of Iraq, has led to fighting that has killed insurgents and Al Qaeda operatives across western and central Iraq in recent months.

Since December , Ayman Al Zawahiri has congratulated Al Baghdadi for the establishment of the so-called Islamic State and has reiterated his plea for fighters in Iraq to overcome their differences in the aftermath of fighting between the Islamic Emirate and other Sunni insurgent groups. The operations of Al Qaeda affiliates continue to be complemented by centrally-planned ideological outreach activities.

In a January 30, audiotape, for example, Ayman al Zawahiri identified "three foundations" of Al Qaeda's political ideology and applied them to events in Iraq and elsewhere. The "three foundations," as outlined by Al Zawahiri are as follows:.

Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi have applied these and other similar principles to issues of democracy, reform, and conflict in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories.

In both of his December statements, for example, Bin Laden clearly stated his view that democracies, constitutional governments, and insufficiently Islamic monarchies are equally unacceptable forms of governance for Islamic societies because they empower human rulers and man-made legal systems rather than "the law of God.

He also frequently characterized the Iraqi government as illegitimate and collaborationist, echoing to his January post-election statement that his followers in Iraq would "not accept the rule of anyone but that of God and His Prophet [Mohammed]. Bin Laden's December statements urged Muslims to oppose the creation of democratic governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories; to resist non-Islamic reform movements in other Islamic societies; and to overturn existing regimes deemed insufficiently-Islamic by Al Qaeda such as the Saudi monarchy.

Al Zawahiri also dismissed Afghan, Egyptian, and Iraqi elections as incomplete and argued that the United States and its allies would not have supported the elections if the results may have yielded Islamist governments that could oppose U. Elected Islamists also have received criticism for not living up to Al Qaeda leaders' expectations. In December , Al Zawahiri pointedly criticized the Palestinian group Hamas for failing to demand "that Palestine have an Islamic constitution before entering any elections.

Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri have based their calls for revolutionary change in Islamic societies on a stated belief in a model of governance where Muslim citizens would empowered to choose and depose their leaders according to Islamic principles and traditions of consultation, or shura.

Al Qaeda military commander Sayf al Adl concluded his May text with advice for Al Zarqawi and other affiliates that includes a detailed strategic framework for the jihadist movement.

Elements of similar strategic thinking appeared in statements issued by Al Zawahiri and Al Zarqawi from through A summary follows:. In a July statement, Al Zawahiri outlined "a near-term plan and a long-term plan" for achieving Al Qaeda objectives:. The near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests, as everyone who attacks the Muslim Ummah must pay the price, in our country and theirs, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and everywhere we are able to strike their interests And the long-term plan is divided into two halves: The first half consists of earnest, diligent work, to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes As for the second half of the long-term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, for jihad preparation and training.

Thus, it is a must to hurry to the fields of jihad for two reasons: The first is to defeat the enemies of the Ummah and repel the Zionist Crusade, and the second is for jihadi preparation and training to prepare for the next stage of the jihad. The "next stage" remains largely undefined in available statements from Al Qaeda leaders, and efforts to define long term goals are likely to prove divisive in light of evident differences in Iraq and other conflict zones over short term strategy and tactics.

Variations in the intensity and prominence of Al Qaeda leaders' anti-Israeli rhetoric have fueled suggestions that Al Qaeda's commitment to the Palestinian cause waxes and wanes depending on the network's need for support—becoming more pronounced during periods when Al Qaeda's actions have alienated supporters or as part of a more outright ideological appeal.

Bin Laden has addressed these charges personally and argued that support for the Palestinians and all Muslims is and will remain essential to Al Qaeda's cause, which is the mobilization of the entire Muslim world in resistance to perceived U. Other Al Qaeda figures have alluded to the desirability of attacks on and eventual conflict with Israel. In January , Al Zarqawi claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on northern Israel, which he claimed was personally ordered by Osama Bin Laden.

He described the attack as "the beginning of a blessed action to strike the Zionist enemy at the heart of its existence.

Al Qaeda leaders' statements reveal sophisticated consideration of the economic and military vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies, particularly with regard to the role of Middle Eastern oil as "the basis of industry" in the global economy. In an interview reportedly conducted on or around the fourth anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Al Zawahiri urged "mujahidin to concentrate their campaigns on the Muslims' stolen oil" and to "not allow the thieves ruling [Muslim] countries to control this oil.

Statements by Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri urging attacks on oil infrastructure and military supply lines could indicate a shift in Al Qaeda's strategic and tactical planning in favor of a more protracted attritional conflict characterized by disruptive attacks on economic and critical energy production infrastructure.

A string of attempted attacks on oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia and Yemen since early have been heralded by some jihadist media outlets as operations conforming to Al Qaeda leaders' calls for economic warfare against the United States and its regional allies. The Saudi Arabian government has sought to discredit Al Qaeda affiliates by portraying their attempted attacks on oil facilities as a threat to the economic lifeblood of the Saudi population.

Statements from Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, the late Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, Sayf al Adl, and Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq display the uncompromising commitment of Al Qaeda's leaders and operational affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda focused on two sequential goals: the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and, ultimately, the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.

The political prescriptions outlined in the statements are rooted in the Islamic principle known as tawhid , or the principle of the absolute unity of God, and an identification of Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social system.

Throughout their statements, Al Qaeda founders and affiliates characterize as "infidels" those who do not share these beliefs, those who oppose the creation of an Islamic state on the terms they describe, and those supporting existing governments and coalition activities in the Islamic world. Al Qaeda's diverse statements contain calculated variations in tone and content that address or appeal to various target audiences. In his early statements, for example, Osama Bin Laden adopted a pseudo-nationalist tone in directly addressing the population of Saudi Arabia and outlining ways that specific groups in Saudi society could support Al Qaeda.

In his and statements addressed to the U. Bin Laden's earlier statements also addressed the American public in several instances that he since has characterized as attempts to explain his motives and outline steps the United States should have taken in order to avoid Al Qaeda attacks.

Over time, the cornerstone of Al Qaeda leaders' religious and political rhetoric has remained consistent: Muslims should view themselves as a single nation and unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis of obligatory defensive jihad.

Non-Islamic government is unacceptable, and Muslims should join Al Qaeda and other sympathetic groups and movements in opposing those seeking to establish secular democratic governments or maintain existing governments deemed to be insufficiently Islamic. Bin Laden has often coupled his "Islamic-unity" rhetoric with litanies of anti-Semitic statements, condemnations of Israel, and allegations of U. Following September 11, , Bin Laden has appealed directly to national groups on the front lines of robust counter-terrorism operations, particularly the populations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories.

Although Bin Laden's ideological rhetoric has remained relatively consistent, he and other Al Qaeda leaders have placed varying levels of emphasis on specific strategic objectives and tactics in their statements over the years. In statements addressed to U.

Nevertheless, Al Qaeda's operational record seems to indicate that its leaders' commitment to specific national causes and limited political objectives are rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader ideological agenda of confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world. For example, Bin Laden's rhetorical treatment of the presence of U. In messages to regional audiences, Bin Laden and his deputies have characterized U.

In his December statements, Bin Laden referred to the confrontation between the U. From a strategic perspective, statements from Al Zawahiri and others advocate for a phased struggle, in which the first goal is the expulsion of U. Small factions in Libya have declared their allegiance to the Islamic State, carrying out attacks in its name. Zawahiri and the other remaining members of the Al Qaeda core are no longer at the forefront of the global jihad; instead, the group that Zawahiri disowned out of concern it would damage the global jihadist project is now vying to lead it.

The two organizations differ fundamentally on whom they see as their main enemy, which strategies and tactics to use in attacking that enemy, and which social issues and other concerns to emphasize. By targeting the United States, Al Qaeda believes it will eventually force the United States to withdraw its support for these regimes and pull out of the region altogether, thus leaving the regimes vulnerable to attack from within.

Al Qaeda considers Shia Muslims to be apostates but sees killing sprees against them as too extreme and thus detrimental to the broader jihadist project. As such, the primary target of the Islamic State has not been the United States, but rather apostate regimes in the Arab world—namely, the Assad regime in Syria and the Abadi regime in Iraq. Like his predecessors in AQI, Baghdadi favors first purifying the Islamic community by attacking Shia and other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist groups.

In addition to this difference in focus, Al Qaeda believes in playing nice with others; the Islamic State does not. When U. Al Qaeda has long used a mix of strategies to achieve its objectives. The model is based on the U. In addition, Al Qaeda supports insurgents that fight against U. The Islamic State embraces some of these goals, but even where there is agreement in principle, its approach is quite different. The Islamic State seeks to build, well, an Islamic state.

So its strategy is to control territory, steadily consolidating and expanding its position. Part of this is inspirational: by creating an Islamic state, it excites many Muslims, who then embrace the group.

And part of it is basic strategy: by controlling territory it can build an army, and by using its army it can control more territory. Al Qaeda in theory supports a caliphate, but Zawahiri envisioned this as a long-term goal. Back in the day, although bin Laden and Zawahiri supported AQI publicly, in private they did not approve of its declaration of an Islamic state in Iraq. In particular, Zawahiri feared that AQI was putting the cart before the horse: you need full control over territory and popular support before proclaiming an Islamic state, not the other way around.

Al Qaeda has never shown much interest in taking or holding territory in order to set up an Islamic state and govern, despite the fact that doing so is one of its stated goals; on the contrary, the only reason it has ever shown interest in territory is as a safe haven and as a place to set up training camps. For example, although Al Qaeda declared the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar to be the caliph of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda leadership never showed any interest in trying to become part of the governing apparatus of the Taliban.

Rather, it used its safe haven in Taliban territory as a base from which to plan additional attacks against the United States and support other jihadists in their fights against area regimes.

Al Qaeda has long favored large-scale, dramatic attacks against strategic or symbolic targets. At the same time, Al Qaeda has backed an array of smaller terrorist attacks on Western, Jewish and other enemy targets, trained insurgents and otherwise tried to build guerrilla armies.